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Surrogate Motherhood Agreements and
the Law in Pennsylvania
I. Introduction
A. Scope of Comment
I signed on an egg. I didn't sign on a baby girl; a clone of
my other little girl . . . . [1]n the delivery room as my baby girl
was being born, I knew I was not going to give her up.1
On March 27, 1986, Melissa Elizabeth, as named by her biolog-
ical father, or Sarah Elizabeth, as named by her biological mother,
or Baby M, as referred to by the New Jersey courts2 and the press,
was born. Although born healthy, Baby M is not an ordinary child.
She is the product of a surrogate mother contract and the object of a
suit for breach of contract, specific performance and custody.'
Shortly after Baby M's birth, her natural mother realized she
could not "freely surrender custody [of Baby MI to the natural fa-
ther . . . and terminate all parental rights to said child," as required
by a surrogate contract she had entered into with the father.4 In
response, the natural father sought and received a temporary custody
order and sued for specific performance. The biological mother and
her husband fled to Florida with the child. When officials discovered
the couple three months later, the natural father and his wife
regained custody of Baby M, and the attorneys prepared for battle.5
This case is the first to seek full adjudication of the validity of a
surrogate contract after the mother has refused to relinquish custody
of the child. This refusal, however, was not the first. For instance,
one surrogate reneged on her contract during pregnancy after she
learned that the biological father's wife had undergone a sex-change
operation to become a woman. The biological father dropped his suit
to avoid publicity about his wife's past, feeling it would prevent the
child from having a normal life."
1. National Law Journal, Sept. 29, 1986, at 8, col. 3. (Quoting Marybeth Whitehead -
surrogate mother of Baby M.)
2. In the Matter of Baby M, FM-25314-86E (Sup. Ct. N.J., Chancery Division, Family
Part).
3. National Law Journal, Sept. 29, 1986, at 8, col. 3.
4. Id. at 8, col. 2.
5. Id. at 8, col. 2-3.
6. Id. at 10, inset col. 2-3.
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A more chilling example of the potential problems surrounding
the use of surrogate mother contracts involved the birth of a child
born with microcephaly, a condition characterized by an abnormally
small head and increased likelihood of mental retardation. The bio-
logical father both refused to accept the child and to pay for the
child's medical expenses. A court ordered him to do so. The dispute
was settled on national television, where blood test results revealed
that the surrogate's husband was the father-in-fact. The surrogate
mother and her husband then admitted to the birth of a prior child
with microcephaly who had died as a result of the disease.7
This Comment is concerned with the legal issues surrounding
the practice of surrogate motherhood by artificial insemination. 8 The
typical surrogate mother agreement has two or three participants:
the sperm-donating father, the surrogate, and if married, her hus-
band.9 Many factors might compel or persuade a couple to choose
surrogate parenting as an alternative to natural childbearing. The
7. Transcript of Donahue Television Interview, No. 02023 (Feb. 2, 1983).
8. Artificial insemination by donor (AID) is the process of impregnating a woman by
injecting the sperm of a man who is not her husband into her vagina or uterus. Wadlington,
Artificial Conception: The Challenge of Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465, 468 (1983). This
procedure is used frequently in the United States, resulting in as many as 20,000 births per
year. Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproductive Technologies, 70
A.B.A. J. 50 (August, 1984). AID differs from surrogate parenting by AID in that the mother
retains custody of the child in the former and the sperm donor retains custody of the child in
the latter. Wadlington, supra, at 475.
The reader should not confuse surrogate motherhood with either in vitro fertilization, or
embryo transplant. In vitro fertilization is also known as test-tube reproduction. The procedure
involves removing mature ova from the woman, fertilizing the ova, and then replacing the ova
in the same woman or a third party. See Wadlington, supra, at 473-74. Embryo transfer is the
opposite of AID. A woman, after undergoing artificial insemination, has the egg flushed from
her uterus and implanted in the wife of the sperm donor. Brotman, Human Embryo Trans-
plants, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 42.
9. For a detailed surrogate mother contract see Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract
to Bear a Child, 20 J. FAM. LAW, 263 (1981-82). Some of the major provisions are: Surrogate
and her husband will not form a parent-child relation with the child, sec. II, at 267; surrogate
and her husband will agree to terminate parental rights as soon as legally and medically possi-
ble, sec. III, at 268; the consideration, sec. V, at 270-72; agreement to undergo paternity test,
see. VI, at 274; assumption of risk by surrogate and husband of all risks incidental to child
bearing and pregnancy, sec. VIII, at 275; payments in event of miscarriage, sec. Xl, at 276-77;
indemnification for support order in event custody is awarded to surrogate, sec. XIII, at 277-
78; agreements that parties are to remain anonymous, sec. XIV & XVII, at 278; restitution in
event of breach by the surrogate and/or her husband, sec. XVIII, at 279; agreement not to
abort in absence of medical emergency, sec. XX, at 280; agreement by natural father to accept
child born with congenital abnormalities, sec. XXI, at 282; procedure should natural father
predecease birth of child, sec. XXII, at 282; agreement by surrogate to adhere to medical
instructions, sec. XXIV, at 282-83; severability, sec. XXVI, at 283.
10. The woman may be infertile or unable to carry a child to term. Fifteen to twenty
percent of American couples of child-bearing age are infertile. Of these, sixty percent are
infertile due to the woman's inability to conceive or carry a child to term. Handel & Sherwyn,
TRIAL 57 (April 1982). Another fear of many couples is the threat of a genetic related disease
or defect. P. REILLY, GENETICS. LAW & SOCIAL POLICY 190 (1977).
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logical alternative is adoption; however, this choice may be inferior
because it entails many uncertainties, such as a shortage of adopta-
ble children 1 and the typically long period of waiting until an adopt-
able child is available. 2 Moreover, the surrogate mother agreement
provides a strong alternative to adoption because it allows a couple
to have a child that is biologically related to one of the parents.'"
This Comment focuses only on the typical surrogate mother
agreement, which involves the surrogate, her husband and the bio-
logical father." The main thrust of the Comment involves the deter-
mination that such agreements are not void, and the identification of
the legal consequences and remedies for any breach that occurs.
B. History and Case Law
Now Sarah, Abraham's wife, bore him no children. She
had an Egyptian maid whose name was Hagar . . . And Sarah
said to Abraham, "Behold now, the Lord has prevented me from
bearing children; go unto my maid; it may be that I shall obtain
children by her." . . . And Hagar bore Abraham a son . . ."I
As evidenced by this quote from Genesis, surrogate mothering is
one of the oldest alternatives for infertile couples who want children.
In recent years, however, the concept has become a center of public
controversy. 6 At least two clinics, Surrogate Parents' Foundation
Inc., in California, and Surrogate Parenting Association, in Ken-
tucky, perform screening services to match willing and able surro-
Beyond these legitimate fears, and the consideration of the mother's age, is a more mod-
ern trend among women-an unwillingness to interfere with their careers. Some commentators
suggest that this is a wholly unethical and unacceptable reason for selecting surrogate mother-
hood. See Wall Street Journal, Sept. 9, 1986, at 41, col. 2 (American Fertility Society deems
surrogate motherhood agreements unethical when used for non-physical reasons). But cf.
REILLY, In Vitro Fertilization: A Legal Perspective, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 359 (1976)
(arguing such a distinction is an unacceptable form of value imposition).
1I. W. MEEZAN, S. KATZ & E. Russo, ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES: A STUDY OF
INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS (1978). The shortage is attributed to increased birth control, abor-
tion and willingness of unwed mothers to raise children. Id. at 9.
12. The wait is estimated at three to seven years. Adoption and Foster Care 1975:
Hearing on Baby Selling Before the Subcomm. on Children and Youth of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (April 28-29, 1975).
13. The child born to a surrogate mother is biologically related to the sperm-donating
husband of the adopting mother.
14. It does not address the entry into surrogate mother contracts by single persons or
homosexual couples. In Pennsylvania, however, any individual may adopt a child. 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2312 (1981).
15. Genesis 16:1, 2, 15.
16. See. e.g., Transcript of Donahue Television Interview, No. 02023 (Feb. 2, 1983).
(During this program, the husband of the surrogate and the purported sperm donor of a child
born with an abnormally small head announced the results of a paternity test. The test re-
vealed the former was actually the father of the child!)
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gates with infertile couples. 17 Surrogate motherhood contracts have
created controversy in several states as their popularity grows. 18
To date, four states have faced the issues of the legality and
enforceability of surrogate mother agreements.' 9 The Michigan Ap-
pellate Court was the first to rule on the legality of a surrogate
mother contract."0 In Doe v. Kelley an infertile couple 2 sought to
have the court declare certain adoption statutes, 22 which made it ille-
gal for one to procure an adoption of a child with consideration, un-
constitutional on the grounds that the statute infringed upon the
couples' fundamental right to privacy.3
The court agreed that the decision to bear or beget a child is a
fundamental right protected by the United States Constitution2" and
that the statute did not prohibit the use of a surrogate mother. 5 The
court ruled, however, that the statute legitimately prohibited the ex-
change of money in conjunction with the use of the state's adoption
procedures.26 The court stated that the contract attempted to use the
adoption statutes to change the legal status of the child, which was
not protected by a fundamental right of privacy.
27
The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently ruled on the legality
and enforceability of surrogate agreements in Surrogate Parenting
Associates, Inc. v. Kentucky.28 Surrogate Parenting involved an at-
17. Markoutsus, Women Who Have Babies for Other Women, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING,
Apr. 1981, at 96, 102, 104. A Michigan attorney, Noel Keane, is a strong advocate of surro-
gate mother agreements. See, e.g., Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122 Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d
90 (1983); Doe v. Kelly, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981); cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1183 (1983); N. KEANE, THE SURROGATE MOTHER (1981); Keane, Legal Problems of Surro-
gate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U. L.J. 147 (1980).
18. These contracts have been reported in California, Kentucky, Michigan and Texas,
see 1979-81 Report On Human Reproduction and the Law, LEGAL-MEDICAL STUDIES at II
A.9; as well as in New Jersey, see N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1986 at A22, col. 1; and in New
York, see Adoption of Baby Girl, L.J., 132 N.Y. Misc.2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1986).
19. Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981); Surrogate Parenting
Associates, Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Adoption of Baby Girl,
L.J., 132 N.Y. Misc.2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1986). In the Matter of Baby M, FM-25314-
86E (Sup. Ct. N.J., Chancery Division, Family Part, 1987).
20. Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
21. "Mrs. Doe" had undergone tubal ligation, which rendered her infertile. Id. at 171-
72, 307 N.W.2d at 440.
22. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.54 (1981). (Prohibits, except for charges and fees ap-
proved by court, the offering, giving or receiving of money or other valuable consideration for
placing a child for adoption, for locating a child for adoption, or for receipt of compensation
for the release, consent or petition for adoption.)
23. 106 Mich. App. at 173, 307 N.W.2d at 440.
24. Id. at 174, 307 N.W.2d at 441 (citing Mahrer v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)).
25. 106 Mich. App. at 173-74, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
26. Id. at 174, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
27. Id.
28. Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. Ct. App.
1986).
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tempt by the state attorney general to have the corporate charter of
the defendant revoked. 9 The attorney general alleged that the de-
fendant's activities in surrogate parenting agreements were an abuse
and misuse of corporate powers and detrimental to the interest and
welfare of the state.30
In support of his charge, the Attorney General asserted that
surrogate mother contracts constituted baby-selling in contravention
of Kentucky laws.3 1 The court disagreed, finding that the legislature
had not spoken on the practice of surrogate motherhood."2 In distin-
guishing surrogate mother agreements from the baby-selling situa-
tion the court stated:
There is no doubt but that the [baby-selling statute] is in-
tended to keep baby brokers from overwhelming an expectant
mother or the parents of a child with financial inducements to
part with the child. But the central fact in the surrogate parent-
ing procedure is that the agreement to bear the child is entered
into before conception. The essential considerations for the sur-
rogate mother when she agrees to the surrogate parenting proce-
dure are not avoiding the consequences of an unwanted preg-
nancy or fear of the financial burden of child rearing. On the
contrary, the essential consideration is to assist a person or
couple who desperately want a child but are unable to conceive
one in the customary manner to achieve a biologically related
offspring. The problem is caused by the wife's infertility. The
problem is solved by artificial insemination. The process is not
biologically different from the reverse situation where the hus-
band is infertile and the wife conceives by artificial
insemination."3
The court went on to hold that surrogate contracts were voida-
ble, but not void."' It concluded that any statement as to the illegal-
ity of these contracts must be made by the legislature.
35
New York is the third jurisdiction which has considered the le-
gality and enforceability of surrogate mother agreements. In Adop-
29. Id. at 210.
30. Id.
31. Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.590(2) (1985), which prohibits sale, purchase or procurement
for sale or purchase of any child for the purpose of adoption; see also KY. REV. STAT. §
199.601(2) (1985), which prohibits voluntary termination of parental rights before five days
after birth of the child; see also Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.500(5) (1985), which prohibits the
consent to adoption prior to five days after birth of the child.
32. Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d at 211.
33. Id. at 211-12 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 213.
35. Id. at 214.
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tion of Baby Girl, L.J.86 neither party was seeking to avoid a surro-
gate mother contract. Rather, the court was ruling on the validity of
a proposed private adoption. 1 The court cited both Kelley" and
Surrogate Parenting. 9 In following the reasoning of the latter, the
court stated that biomedical science has advanced into a new era of
genetics which was not contemplated by either the Kentucky or New
York legislatures."' It also noted the inherent differences between
baby-selling and surrogate agreements. The court agreed that such
contracts were voidable, and not void, 4 1 and that it was the duty of
the legislature specifically to allow or disallow any payments to the
surrogate. 2 Ultimately, the adoption was granted and the surrogate
was allowed to collect her fee.48
The final jurisdiction to rule on the enforceability of these con-
tracts is also the most controversial. A New Jersey trial court, in In
the Matter of Baby M, upheld a surrogate mother contract and spe-
cifically enforced the contract. Judge Harvey R. Sorkow held that
neither adoption laws or public policy prohibit surrogate agreements.
The opinion was a sort of hybrid which merged contract law with the
test for the "best interest of the child," and it then utilized the
court's parens patria power to protect the interests of the child."
Judge Sorkow wrote:
This court holds that whether there will be specific per-
formance of this surrogacy contract depends on whether doing
so is in the child's best intersts . . . Any other result would in-
deed conflict with the court's role as parens patriae . . . An
agreement between parents is inevitably subservient to the con-
siderations of the best interests of the child. The welfare of a
child cannot be subscribed by an agreement of the parents...
It must follow that "best interests" are paramount to the con-
tract and this court must answer a best interests inquiry if it is
to specifically perform the surrogate parenting agreement.45
The opinion relies on well settled custody law that a custody
agreement is voidable, but not void. In short, the Judge held that the
36. 132 N.Y. Misc.2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1986).
37. Id. at 814.
38. Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438.
39. Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209.




44. FM-25314-86E (Sup. Ct. N.J., Chancery Division, Family Part).
45. Baby M. Ruling May Invite Attack, 119 N.J.L.J. 606 (col. 3, April 9, 1987).
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contract must be in the best interests of the child, and if it is, then
the contract is specifically enforceable.
II. The Legality of Surrogate Parenting Agreements in
Pennsylvania
This section of the Comment analyzes the various legal issues
that might render a surrogate motherhood agreement illegal in
Pennsylvania. The primary obstacles to a surrogate mother contract
are the Commonwealth's baby-selling statute" and related principles
of public policy.47 Questions might also arise concerning adultery"'
and the illegitimacy of the child.49 If and when the Pennsylvania
courts are confronted with the issue of the legality of surrogate
agreements, the outcome should be that the contracts are voidable,
but not void.50
A. Baby-Selling
Superficially, a typical baby-selling statute seems to disallow
surrogate parenting agreements."1 Pennsylvania's baby-selling stat-
ute provides: "A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree
if he deals in humanity, by trading, bartering, buying, selling or
dealing in infant children."5 " However, close scrutiny of the surro-
gate situation, as well as an analysis of the intention behind this stat-
ute, reveals that the statute does not govern.
Because the statute is penal in nature it must be strictly con-
strued.5 3 The question arises whether the typical surrogate agree-
46. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4305 (1982).
47. The public policy argument normally suggests that the payment of a fee for the
child endangers the child's psychological well-being by treating the child as a mere commercial
object. See Maudsley, Surrogate Parenthood A Need for Legislative Direction, 71 ILL. B.J.
412 (1983); but cf. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U. L.J. 147
(1980) (suggesting the policy of commercialization is the norm in the United States when
seeking to fulfill a need).
48. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 110-I and accompanying text.
50. See. e.g., Commonwealth ex rel Children's Aid Society v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 92, 66
A.2d 300, 304 (1949) (stating "contracts as to the custody of children are voidable agreements
• ..and are subject to being set aside by the courts in the best interests of the child.").
51. Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), (holding that surro-
gate parenting agreements were in contravention of the state's baby-selling statutes).
52. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4305 (1982).
53. I PA. CONS. STAT. § 1928(b)(1) (1972). Strictly construed is defined as meaning
that:
[Tihe court will not extend punishment to cases not plainly within the lan-
guage used, but at the same time such statutes are to be fairly and reasonably
construed, and will not be given such a narrow and strained construction as to
exclude from their operation cases plainly within their scope and meaning.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1275 (5th ed. 1979).
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ment falls plainly within the language and scope of the statute.5 4
There is no doubt that these statutes are intended to keep the over-
bearing baby-broker from inducing a single, expectant mother, who
is unwilling or unable to raise a child, to sell her child.5 The typical
baby-selling situation may also involve a financially burdened
couple, 56 or a couple who simply want to profit by selling their unex-
pected baby to a broker.
The essential contemplation of the surrogate mother arrange-
ment is to assist an infertile couple that desperately wants a child
but is unable to conceive. The distinction is one of timing. 7 The sur-
rogate is not pregnant when the agreement is executed.5 8 Therefore,
the concerns for overreaching, overbearing or even undue duress are
not present.59 The surrogate is in a position to accept or reject the
agreement without the powerful influence of already carrying a
baby.60 Further, she need not worry about whether she can afford to
raise the child, whether she should abort the child, or whether she
wants to raise the child.
Clearly, the statute does not contemplate the surrogate mother
situation. 1 To hold that such agreements fall plainly within the
meaning of the statute is to legislate from the bench." Further, it is
absurd to argue that the father is purchasing his own child.6 3 In es-
54. See I PA. CONS. STAT. § 1928(b)(1) (1972).
55. See Surrogate Parenting, Inc., 704 S.W.2d at 211; see also note 33 and accompany-
ing text; see also Adoption of Baby Girl, L.J., 132 N.Y. Misc.2d at 977, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 817
(stating New York Statute was designed to keep baby brokers from coercing expectant
mothers or parents with financial inducements to part with their child).
56. Surrogate Parenting, Inc., 704 S.W.2d 209; Adoption of Baby Girl, L.J., 132 N.Y.
Misc.2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813.
57. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
58. The potential for feelings of guilt or loss on the surrogate mother's part is minimized
because the mother consciously chooses to bear a child before conception. Keane, Legal
Problems, supra note 17, at 153.
59. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
60. Id.
61. See Adoption of Baby Girl, L.J., 132 N.Y. Misc.2d at 977, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
See also supra note 55.
62. In Adoption of Baby Girl, L.J., 132 N.Y. Misc.2d at 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 818, the
court stated:
Current legislation does not expressly foreclose the use of surrogate mothers
or the compensation to them under parenting agreements. Accordingly, the court
finds that this is a matter for the legislature rather than for the judiciary to
attempt to determine by the impermissible means of "judicial" legislation. In its
absence, this court will not appropriate the function of the legislature . . . As
with any contractual agreement, especially as it relates to adoption, the court
will continue to review such contracts and the circumstances surrounding them
to determine whether there has been any overreaching, unfair advantage, fraud,
undue influence, or excessive payments.
In this case $10,000 was not deemed excessive. Id. at 974, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
63. It is the express intention of the Pennsylvania Legislature that none of its statutes
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
sence, the father is paying for the custody of the child, and a con-
tract for child custody in Pennsylvania is voidable, but not void. 6
B. Public Policy
A strong reason for holding that surrogate motherhood agree-
ments are not in contravention of the baby-selling statute is that
most courts consider custody contracts which exchange the child for
valuable consideration, not in light of the statute, but rather in light
of public policy."5 The argument has been advanced that, notwith-
standing the non-applicability of baby-selling statutes, surrogate
parenting agreements are void as against public policy.""
The precise definition of public policy in contract situations is
elusive. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that for a con-
tract to be void on public policy grounds:
[it] "must be inconsistent with sound policy and good
morals as to the consideration or thing to be done." If, by well
settled judicial precedent, the law has determined that such a
contract as this tends to the injury of the public, or is inconsis-
tent with sound morality, we would feel bound to follow the law
thus declared, without regard to our own notions of the tendency
of the contract.6"
Hence, we must look to well settled judicial precedent in determin-
ing the validity of surrogate agreements.
In Enders v. Enders," the court used this definition to declare
that a contract between a woman and her father-in-law, whereby the
woman agreed to surrender custody of the child in exchange for
$20,000 to her and $10,000 to her child, was not against public pol-
create an absurd result. I PA. CONS. STAT. § 1922(l) (1972). The result would be different if
the natural father's wife were a party to the contract. Clearly, she would be paying for adop-
tion and custody of the child. See Brophy, supra note 9, at 264, (making adoptive mother a
party to the contract would violate all states' bans against "buying children").
64. See. e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Society v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 92, 66
A.2d 300, 304 (1949); Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care, 228 Pa. Super. 371, 324 A.2d
562 (1974) (contract providing agency right to remove child from foster parents is voidable
when best interests of child conflict with the contract).
65. See, e.g., Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. 266, 30 A. 129 (1894); Commonwealth ex rel.
Children's Aid Society v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 66 A.2d 300; Gorden v. Cutler, 324 Pa. Super. 35,
471 A.2d 449 (1983); Reimche v. First National Bank of Nevada, 512 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.
1975).
66. See Op. Ky. ATTY. GEN., 81-18, 7 FAM. L. REP. 2246 (BNA 1981). The argument
was expressly rejected in Surrogate Parenting Assoc. Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209
(1981).
67. Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. at 271, 30 A. at 130.
68. Id.
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icy.6 9 The court relied heavily on the fact that this was a family
compact entered into wholly for the welfare of the child.70 The court
also stated that a contract between strangers, entered into solely for
the purpose of avoiding parental duty and gaining the benefit of the
bargain, was against public policy.
7 1
A recent Pennsylvania case held that a custody contract benefit-
ing a child will not ipso facto be categorized as against public policy
without first looking at the facts of each case. 2 In Gorden v. Cutler,
the court was asked to rule on the validity of a contract whereby the
mother granted consent to adopt in exchange for the adopting
couple's promise to pay her medical expenses.73 The court pointed
out that such an agreement was nowhere prohibited74 by Pennsylva-
nia's adoption laws.75
To the contrary, the court in Gorden noted that the legislature
made repeated reference in the Report of Intention to Adopt,76 and
in the Report of Intermediary,77 to the documentation and itemiza-
tion of "monies and consideration paid or to be paid to or received
by the intermediary or to or by any other person or persons to the
knowledge of the intermediary by reason of the adoption place-
ment."'78 The court concluded that the payment of money, at least
for medical expenses, was not foreign to the legislature. 79
The court went on to discuss Enders, and stated that it was only
tangentially related to the situation at hand because Enders involved
a family compact.8" The court held that in a situation where no fam-
ily compact was involved, consideration paid that did not inure to the
benefit of the child was illegal. 8' Hence, payment of medical ex-
penses to the mother was in the best interest of the child she was
carrying and was valid.82 In the case of monies that inurred to the
69. Id. at 273, 30 A. at 131.
70. Id. at 273-74, 30 A. at 130.
71. Id. at 273, 30 A. at 130.
72. Gorden v. Cutler, 324 Pa. Super. 35, 51-52, 471 A.2d 449, 457 (1983).
73. 324 Pa. Super. 35, 471 A.2d 449.
74. Id. at 49, 471 A.2d at 455-56.
75. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2101-2910 (1985).
76. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2531 (1985). (The report shall set forth an itemized account-
ing of monies paid or to be paid to the intermediary. Id. § 2531(b)(4).)
77. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2533 (1985).
78. Id. § 2533(b)(8) (1985).
79. Gorden v. Cutler, 324 Pa. Super. at 49, 471 A.2d at 456.
80. Id. at 50, 471 A.2d at 456.
81. Id. at 53, 471 A.2d at 458.
82. Id. at 50, 471 A.2d at 457. The court stated:
It is commonly the case that persons wishing to adopt a child will make
provisions with its mother, or mother and father, to pay hospital and medical
expenses in connection with the care of the mother and child. There is nothing in
1094
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benefit of the mother only, the contract would be void.8"
In Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Society v. Gard, the
agency had contracted with the Gards to provide a foster home for
children in return for board, clothing, and medical care.8 The
agency retained the right to regain custody at any time, and litiga-
tion erupted when it attempted to do so. In refusing to uphold the
agency's rights, the supreme court stated: "[T]he child was treated
as a chattel without any rights in respect to its own happiness and
physical well-being. That a child cannot be made the subject of a
contract with the same force and effect as if it were a chattel has
long been established law." 85 The court further noted that because
the contract "came into being not for the [agency's] benefit, but for
the child's benefit . . . it [would] be given only such legal effect as
[would] serve the purpose of its creation." 81 The Gards received cus-
tody based upon the long and affectionate relationship that had de-
veloped between them and the infant.
By combining the rationales of these three cases, a set of rules
can be developed to apply to the surrogate parenting agreement.
First, medical expenses paid to the pregnant woman are legal be-
cause they are in the best interests of the child.8" Second, outside a
family compact, payment above and beyond medical expenses are
void as against public policy.88 Third, the contract must be read in
the light of the best interests of the child, as the child cannot be
viewed as a chattel without any rights in respect to its own happiness
and physical well being.89
It can be questioned whether the surrogate mother agreement is
really a family compact. In Enders, the contract involved was be-
tween the mother and her ex-husband's father. In the surrogate situ-
ation the contract is between the mother and father of the child,
although they are not married. Exactly what type of relationship cre-
ates the family compact? Is it marriage, or is it a relation between
this practice inimical to public policy. Indeed, it is productive of the welfare of
the child.
Id.
83. See id. at 53, 471 A.2d at 458.
84. 362 Pa. 85, 66 A.2d 300 (1949).
85. Id. at 92, 66 A.2d at 304, quoted in Gorden v. Cutler, 324 Pa. Super. at 51, 471
A.2d at 457.
86. Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Society v. Gard, 362 Pa. at 96, 66 A.2d at
306, quoted in Gorden v. Cutler, 324 Pa. Super. at 51, 471 A.2d at 457.
87. 324 Pa. Super. at 50, 471 A.2d at 457.
88. See id. at 50, 471 A.2d at 456; see also Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. at 270, 30 A. 130.
89. Commonwealth ex el. Children's Aid Society v. Gard, 362 Pa. at 92, 66 A.2d at
304. See also Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. at 269, 30 A. at 130 (a contract intended to provide
for the welfare of the child is not injurious to public good or morals).
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the party seeking custody and the child? It is the latter. The mother
in Enders was hesitant about giving her child away to her father-in-
law who lived a considerable distance away. She had a limited rela-
tionship with this man because she was separated from his son.9"
Since the child, however, was biologically related to the grandfather,
the court presumed the contract was in the best interests of the
child.91 When an agreement for custody of a child involves a close
biological relation between the child and the third party, the court
must look beyond the benefit inurring to the mother and focus on the
benefits to the child.
The benefits in the surrogate agreement overwhelmingly accrue
to the child. But for the contract and the parties' agreement the
child would not be born. There is no greater gift than life itself. Fur-
ther, the whole situation contemplates a couple whose efforts have
been frustrated in their attempts to conceive.9" They strive for a
child biologically related to the father. The presumption follows that
this would create a family setting very beneficial to the child.
In light of the relation between father and child, and the bene-
fits which accrue to the child being brought up in a fit family setting,
it would be an injustice to void all such agreements on the grounds
of public policy. "The fears that approval of such a policy would
lead to the bartering or sale of children are not borne out where we
deal only with agreements between parents or close family
members.
9 3
C. Adoption, Adultery, Illegitimacy
Several commentators have suggested that surrogate mother
contracts violate state adoption statutes.94 The Pennsylvania Adop-
tion Act requires consent to an adoption by either the adoptee or his
parents or guardians, and perhaps by the spouse of the adopting par-
90. Enders, 164 Pa. at 266, 30 A. at 129. It is not clear whether the two were actually
divorced. However, the father-in-law apparently lived in Delaware County, and the woman
lived in Berks County with her father.
91. Id. at 267, 30 A. at 130 (stating: "We concede ... that a contract of a parent, by
which he bargains away the custody of a child to a stranger ...is void as against public
policy . . . .But this was a family compact.").
92. This Comment does not contemplate situations wherein the couple utilizes a surro-
gate agreement for reasons other than maternal infertility, inability to carry a child to term, or
advanced age. Nevertheless, a distinction between physical and non-physical reasons for choos-
ing surrogate motherhood seems unjust. See supra note 10.
93. Reimche v. First National Bank of Nevada, 512 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1975).
94. Comment, Womb for Rent: A Call for Pennsylvania Legislation Legalizing and
Regulating Surrogate Parenting Agreements, [hereinafter Womb for Rent] 90 DICK. L. REV.
227, 243 (1985); Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family": A Proposed Uniform
Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73 GEo. L.J. 1283, 1292 (1985) [hereinafter Modern Family].
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ent.95 It further provides that consent given prior to or within 72
hours after the birth of the child is invalid. 96 The typical surrogate
agreement should contain a provision whereby the surrogate agrees
to consent to the adoption of the child as soon after birth as is al-
lowed by law.97
It has been argued that the application of the adoption statute is
inappropriate in the surrogate situation." In Pennsylvania, all legis-
lation enacted after September 1, 1937 is subject to strict interpreta-
tion.9 9 Because the adoption clause of a surrogate contract evidences
consent to adoption even before conception, it does not fall plainly
within the meaning of the above statute. The opposing argument is
that consent still occurred prior to the 72 hour waiting period, and so
falls plainly within the meaning of the statute. Thus, it is argued,
legislative action is necessary to except the surrogate contract adop-
tion from the general rule.'0
However, neither argument encompasses the entire situation.
First, the natural father need not adopt the child, because he is le-
gally recognized as the father once paternity is established.' 0 ' Sec-
ond, the adopting woman is not a party to the contract. 102 Thus, no
consideration is being offered in contravention of the adoption stat-
ute for premature consent to adoption. Rather, this provision of the
contract can be considered surplusage which merely indicates the in-
tention of the parties. Realistically, the statute provides the surro-
gate mother with the noncontractual option of refusing to consent to
the child's adoption.' 03
Furthermore, even if the adopting mother was a party to the
contract in violation of the baby-selling statutes, or the early consent
clause was held to be in violation of the adoption statute, that would
not cause the entire contract to fall. In Pennsylvania, a court can
95. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711 (1985).
96. Id. § 2711(c) (1985).
97. Brophy, supra note 9, at 268. The sample contract provides:
The Surrogate and her Husband agree that they will on the (fourth) day
after delivery of the child, or as soon thereafter as is medically possible, institute
proceedings . . . to terminate their respective paternal rights to said child and
sign any and all necessary affidavits, documents, etc. in order to further the in-
tent and purposes of this agreement.
98. See, e.g., Note, Modern Family, supra note 94, at 1292; Keane, supra note 17, at
152-53 (asserting the statute does not contemplate pre-conception consent).
99. I PA. CONS. STAT. § 1928 (1972).
100. See Womb for Rent, supra note 94.
101. This discussion does not concern a dispute between the parties. Rather, it contem-
plates whether surrogate agreements violate the statute "on their face."
102. See Brophy, supra note 9 at 263-64.
103. If the surrogate selects this option she has, of course, breached the contract.
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sever that portion of a contract that is in contravention of a statute,
provided the remainder of the statute is enforceable with separate
consideration. 0
The adoption clause could be severed from the contract, leaving
the remainder intact. The separate consideration on the part of the
surrogate is the surrender of custody of the child to the biological
father. Because contracts for the custody of children are voidable,
but not void, the contract is enforceable with or without the adoption
clause, and the statute merely affords the surrogate the right to re-
fuse to the adoption of her child by the natural father's wife. If she
does not, the state would have no valid reason to prevent adoption.
Other problems which might arise concerning the legality of
surrogate agreements concern questions of adultery'05 and illegiti-
macy.1'0 However, in Pennsylvania, the defense of connivance,
whereby a spouse consents to the other spouse's adultery, defeats a
claim of adultery. 07 In the surrogate mother contract the husband of
the surrogate consents to her being artificially inseminated. 08 Fur-
thermore, the idea of calling artificial insemination adultery is ab-
surd.' 09 The woman is inseminated by a syringe which she operates,
or a doctor operates. No physical or sexual contact with a man other
than her husband is involved.
The issue of legitimacy has been resolved in many states by spe-
cifically legislating that a child born by way of artificial insemination
is presumed legitimate." 0 Further, declaring the child illegitimate
and voiding the agreement on these grounds defeats a strong state
interest in the welfare of the child. In fact, if the surrogate is mar-
ried the child is legitimate. If not, the surrogate agreement contem-
plates prompt adoption of the child,"' which actually legitimizes the
104. Frazier v. Thompson, 2 Watts & S. 235 (1841).
105. See, e.g., Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251, 49 Ont. L.R. 15 (1921) (artificial in-
semination is adulterous and hence illegal); but cf. People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal.2d 280, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 7, 437 P.2d 495 (1968) (finding of adultery is absurd).
106. The problem with characterizing a child born by artificial insemination as illegiti-
mate is that it defeats the strong public policy in favor of the legitimacy of all children. Gur-
sky v. Gursky, 39 Misc.2d 1083, 1088, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
107. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 207(a) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
108. See Brophy, supra note 9, at 267 (providing: "Husband is in agreement with the
purposes, intents, and provisions of this agreement and agrees that his wife, the Surrogate,
shall be artificially inseminated . . .").
109. I PA. CONS. STAT. § 1922(l) (1972). It is the express intention of the Common-
wealth that no statute yields an absurd result.
110. Note, Modern Family, supra note 94, at 1293 n.74 (listing all states with such a
provision; Pennsylvania is not one).




III. Rights and Remedies in Case of Breach of the Surrogate
Mother Contract
The remainder of this Comment examines the consequences of
breach of a surrogate parenting agreement and defines the parties'
various rights and possible remedies. Generally speaking, a surrogate
agreement can be breached in any one of three distinct time periods:
before insemination, during pregnancy, and after birth. Because the
legal issues become more complicated with the passage of time, the
Comment focuses separately on each of these time periods.
A. Breach Prior to Insemination
It is unlikely that the biological father and his wife ("the
couple") 113 will breach before the surrogate is inseminated because
they presumably are in desperate want of a child. However, in the
event of a breach by the couple at this point, the damages should be
easily ascertained. The general rule is that damages for breach of
contract are awarded in an amount sufficient to place the aggrieved
party in the same economic position she would have been in had the
contract been performed, less any amount she was able to miti-
gate." 4 Courts would deny a claim for specific performance if there
exists an adequate remedy at law." 5 Thus, in the event of breach by
the couple, the intended surrogate would be able to recover damages,
but not specific performance, because monetary damages would be
adequate.
The surrogate is the party more likely to breach at this point. In
order to place the couple in as good a position had the contract been
performed, specific performance of the contract might be sought.
The court, however, would not grant this remedy for several reasons.
First, the contract is one for personal services, a type of contract
112. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2521 (1985). A decree of termination of parental rights ex-
tinguishes the former parents' rights to notice of any adoption proceeding, grants custody to
the adopting parent or agency, and places the adopting person or agency in loco parentis of the
child.
113. For the remainder of the text the biological father and his wife will be collectively
referred to as "the couple."
114. See, e.g., Bellefonte Area School District v. Lipner, 81 Pa. Commw. 334, 473 A.2d
741 (1984); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 544 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter CALAMARI
& PERILLO].
115. See Mussoline v. Tax Claim Bureau of Schuylkill County, 410 Pa. 187, 188 A.2d
740 (1963).
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courts hesitate to enforce specifically.116 Second, whenever the exe-
cution of a decree of specific performance requires the personal su-
pervision and oversight of the court for a considerable length of time,
the court should refuse specific performance and leave the party to
his remedy at law. 117 Clearly, such a decree would require the court
to monitor the mother's behavior for at least the gestation period.
Thus, the couple must seek either legal or statutory remedies.
Since there is no legislation in Pennsylvania which deals with surro-
gate parenting,"' the couple must pursue legal remedies. This gives
rise to the problem of accurately ascertaining damages. 1 9
An action for damages is an inadequate remedy at law when
damages cannot be accurately computed or ascertained.1 20 Since
conception had not yet occurred, it would be difficult to ascertain the
amount the couple lost upon breach of the contract. 2' It seems the
only amount the couple could recover is for expenses incurred after
executing the agreement - restitution.
122
The couple may attempt to avoid this dilemma by inserting a
liquidated damages clause in the contract. Such a clause is valid and
enforceable provided it is a reasonable measure of damages and not
a penalty for breach. 23 Whether such a provision would be enforcea-
116. See McMenamin v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 356 Pa. 88, 91, 51 A.2d 702,
703 (1947).
117. See Reliable Tire Distributors v. Kelly Springfield Tire Co., 607 F. Supp. 361
(E.D. Pa. 1985). It seems unlikely that the couple would seek specific performance in this
situation, because they would be uncertain of the fitness of the surrogate to perform.
118. See Womb for Rent, supra note 94, at 241.
119. The uncertainty arises from such factors as the impossibility of knowing that the
surrogate would have conceived, or carried the baby to term. Most importantly, the value of
having a child would be difficult to compute. Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of
the Problems and Suggestions for Solutions, 50 TENN. L. REV. 84, n.63 (1982).
120. Clark v. Pennsylvania State Police, 496 Pa. 310, 313, 436 A.2d 1383, 1385 (1981)
(citing Strank v. Mercy Hospital of Johnstown, 383 Pa. 54, 117 A.2d 697 (1955); H. Daroff &
Sons, Inc. v. Vitullo, 350 Pa. 501, 39 A.2d 595 (1944)).
121. See supra note 119.
122.
The basic aim of restitution is to place the plaintiff in the same economic
position as he enjoyed prior to contracting. Thus . . . the plaintiff's recovery is
for the reasonable value of service rendered . . less the reasonable value of any
counter-performance . . . The plaintiff recovers the reasonable value whether or
not the defendant benefitted from the performance . . . (Of course,) the defend-
ant must have received performance; acts merely preparatory to performance
will not justify an action for restitution. (However), (i)f what the plaintiff has
done is part of the agreed exchange, it is deemed to be "received" by the
defendant.
CALAMARI & PERILLO, CONTRACTS, at 574 (footnotes omitted).
123. See, e.g., In re Plywood Co. of Pa., 425 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1970). The presumption
is that such clauses are penalties. Kunkle & Jordan v. Wherry, 189 Pa. 198, 42 A. 112 (1899)
(one cannot profit by default of another by causing forfeiture). In ascertaining the reasonable-
ness of the clause, the court must look to the language of the contract, the intention of the
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ble depends on the facts of each case. When it is difficult to deter-
mine damages, however, and the amount is reasonable, the court is
likely to enforce a damage clause.12 4 If the couple could prove the
amount was reasonable, they should be allowed to recover.1
25
B. Breach During Pregnancy
This section explores the ramifications of breach by the surro-
gate or breach by the couple during pregnancy, as well as problems
concerning paternity of the child. The provisions of the agreement
focused upon here should be included in every surrogate mother con-
tract.12  The couple seeking the child should demand clauses stating
that the surrogate will not abort in the absence of medical emer-
gency, 12 7 she will seek appropriate medical care, 28 and she will re-
frain from personal activities which might endanger her health or
the health of the fetus.'
29
1. Promise not to abort.-Practically speaking, the only effect
of a promise on the part of the mother not to abort 30 the fetus is
parties, the subject matter, the amount stipulated and the difficulty in measuring the breach in
damages. Id. at 201-02, 42 A. at 112.
A clause providing recission and restitution has been suggested by one attorney:
In the event the Surrogate and/or her Husband violate any of the provisions
. . . this agreement may be immediately terminated by the Natural Father
without any further liability . . . In the event the Natural Father does terminate
the agreement, the Natural Father shall be under no obligation to pay any mon-
ies to the Surrogate or reimburse any of her expenses or her Husband's ex-
penses. In addition, the Surrogate and her Husband must reimburse the Natural
Father for all monies expended on her behalf pursuant to this agreement.
Brophy, supra note 9, at 279, sec. XVIII.
It is this author's opinion that a reasonable clause might also include attorney fees in-
curred for collecting any monies, as well as costs for obtaining substitute performance.
124. See Commonwealth Dept. of Environmental Resources v. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co., 40 Pa. Commw. 133, 396 A.2d 885 (1970).
125. In Pennsylvania, intentional infliction of emotional distress is recoverable if the
tort-feasor intended to inflict emotional distress and she did so by outrageous conduct. Reist v.
Manwiller, 231 Pa. Super. 444, 449 n.4, 332 A.2d 518, 520 n.4 (1978) (citations omitted).
Although tort remedies are beyond the scope of this Comment, the possibility of such an action
is noteworthy.
126. See generally Brophy, supra note 9.
127. Id. at 280, section XX (stating surrogate will not abort the child absent medical
emergency or the physiological abnormality of the fetus).
128. Id. at 282, section XXIV (stating surrogate agrees to adhere to medical instruc-
tions and regular examinations).
129. Id. (stating surrogate will not use cigarettes, alcohol, illegal drugs, or medication
not prescribed by the specified physician).
130. Absent medical emergency it is illegal to abort a fetus after it has reached viability.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3210 (1982). Therefore, the surrogate could only legally abort prior to
this time. Viability is defined as that time, in light of the most advanced medical technology,
which the fetus could survive with reasonable likelihood outside of the mother's womb with or
without artificial support systems. id. § 3203.
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that it states clearly the intention of the parties. Clearly, in the event
that the surrogate 1 ' chooses to abort, the couple may pursue only
limited remedies.
In light of the biological father's paternal interest in the child,
he may seek to enjoin an intended abortion and compel performance.
He would not meet with success, however, for two reasons. First,
specific performance would require extensive supervision by the court
because of the personal nature of performance. 3 2 Second, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that abortion is the personal right of the
pregnant woman and the consent of a putative father is unnecessary
in order for a woman to proceed with abortion. 33
Thus, the couple may pursue only legal remedies which are
measured in the form of losses caused and the gains prevented, less
any savings incurred by the breach. 8 4 It is difficult to ascertain the
gains prevented and the savings realized by the couple in the event
of abortion.' 85 The couple would be able to collect damages for all
foreseeable expenses incurred in reasonable reliance on the con-
tract.8 6 Further, the couple would be entitled to full restitution for
any amounts paid to the surrogate or expended on behalf of entering
the agreement. 7
Of course, the couple could seek to enforce a liquidated dam-
ages clause. Again, whether a court would enforce such a clause de-
131. It is possible that the couple may seek to compel an abortion. However, such an
attempt would be offensive to the surrogate's constitutionally protected right of privacy. See
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70 n.I I (1976) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972)). Furthermore, Pennsylvania law prohibits a court or state official from order-
ing or coercing a woman to have an abortion absent a medical emergency. 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3215(f) (1982).
132. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
133. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70 (1976). The argument might be
advanced that the surrogate made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver to her right of
privacy. However, it seems such an argument would be moot. For instance, one may waive his
right to remain silent after a criminal arrest, which means anything he says is of evidentiary
value. It does not mean that he cannot later decide to reassert his rights and resume silence.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1963).
134. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329 (1933). Of course, damages could be analyzed
as per restitution for benefits conferred upon the breacher; reliance interest for detriment in-
curred by breachee in reliance on the contract; and expectation interest for the lost prospect of
gain. CALAMARI & PERILLO, § 14-4, at 522.
135. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
136. When the expectation interest is uncertain or nonexistent the aggrieved party can
recover his reliance interest, that is, his expenses of preparation and part performance, as well
as other foreseeable expenses incurred in reliance upon the contract. The assumption is that
the "value of the contract at least would have covered the outlay." PERILLO & CALAMARI
CONTRACTS at 532. For example, "a farmer who plants defective seed may or may not be able
to prove what the value of his crop would have been if the seed had been of merchantable
quality." If not, he is able to recover the value of the seed, the rental value of the land and the
cost of preparing the land. Id. (footnotes omitted).
137. See supra note 122.
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pends on whether the provision was intended to provide a reasonable
estimation of damages, or to prevent breach by imposing a
penalty. 188
2. Promise to seek medical care.-If the surrogate failed or
refused to seek medical care during pregnancy, the couple could suc-
ceed in obtaining an injunction requiring the surrogate to do so. The
problem of court supervision would be minimized as the contract
should state the specific times the surrogate must see a doctor. 13 9
Therefore, if she failed to report for medical care the doctor need
only inform the court, which would order her to seek such care. This
action is justified, notwithstanding the fact that performance is still
personal in nature, because the best interests of the child are now
involved and the state's interest in the welfare of the child, at least
after viability, outweighs the mother's right to privacy. 40
This remedy may be unappealing to the couple because the fit-
ness of the surrogate to carry the fetus to term may now seem ques-
tionable. They could, therefore, resort to reliance and restitution
damages,' 4  or damages under a liquidated damages clause. 14 2 Even-
tually, however, the question of paternity may provide the surrogate
with statutory remedies 43 in the form of support should she choose
to give birth.
3. Promise to refrain from activities detrimental to the health
of the child.-The couple may discover that the surrogate is ad-
dicted to nicotine, drugs or alcohol. 144 In this situation it is virtually
impossible for a court to enjoin these activities without taking the
surrogate into custody and monitoring her constantly.' 45 The most
realistic remedy is for reliance and restitution damages, or liquidated
damages.
46
138. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
139. See Brophy, supra note 9, at 283 (stipulating no fewer doctor visits than monthly
during first seven months, bi-monthly during the eighth month, and weekly thereafter until
birth).
140. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973).
141. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., N. KEANE & D. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 102-07, 109-10, 128-32
(1981) (tells of incident of surrogate who was addicted to both drugs and alcohol).
145. This supervision by the courts traditionally has not been tolerated. See supra note
117 and accompanying text.
146. In the event the surrogate breaches by refusing medical care or mistreating her
health, another complex problem arises. Considering the best interests of the child, the biologi-
cal father likely could not deny paternity once the child was born, which might subject him to
claims for support for the child. If the couple rejects the child, is that in the child's best
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4. Breach by the biological father during preg-
nancy.-Although it is unlikely that the couple will reject the child
in utero, 14 7 the possibility exists. In that event, the surrogate could
sue and recover the value of the contract. 4 8 Considering the likeli-
hood that the surrogate would not want to keep the child, this rem-
edy would hardly restore the status quo. Therefore, the surrogate
could ask for statutory and contractual remedies.
The remedy most favorable to all parties, except the child,
would be for the woman to abort the fetus and recover any costs
incident thereto. 9 This choice, however, is entirely the surrogate's
until the fetus reaches viability, 50 and is precluded by law after that
point.' 5' Therefore, the parties may choose to proceed to birth and
place the child for adoption.
152
An alternative for the surrogate is to proceed to birth and to
establish paternity in the biological father.15 3 If the surrogate were
successful, she could obtain a support order 54 for the child. 55 Suc-
cess would not be certain, however, if the surrogate was married.
Assuming the surrogate was married when she gave birth, the
law presumes that the child is legitimately that of the surrogate's
husband. 56 The presumption stands until a preponderance of the ev-
interest? Further, will the mother be able to support the child on her own? Clearly, the court
cannot compel the couple to accept custody of the child. See supra note 121 and accompany-
ing text. However, the court might compel support payments for the child. See infra notes
153-60 and accompanying text.
147. It has been said that couples use surrogate contracts as a last resort. See Note, The
Surrogate Mother Contract in Indiana, 15 IND. L. REV. 807, 822 (1982). It also has been
argued that a couple would only breach if the child were defective. See Coleman, supra note
119, at 83, n.56.
148. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
149. The couple might assert this remedy under a theory of the duty to mitigate dam-
ages. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 112, at 538. However, the choice of abortion is a
fundamental right of the pregnant woman and the court would not order such a remedy. See
supra note 131.
150. See supra note 131.
151. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3210 (1982).
152. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2101 et seq. (1985). The couple may decide not to
breach, and instead pay the surrogate and place the child up for adoption themselves. If they
do not pay, the surrogate could collect on the contract, plus collect any fees incurred proceed-
ing to adoption. See supra notes I11-13 and accompanying text. In reality, such a remedy is
simply enforcing the contract, and the couple could avoid the uncertainties of litigation by
proceeding to adoption themselves.
153. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4511 (1985).
154. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4502 (1985). Yet both parents of an illegitimate child have
the duty to support her. See Commonwealth v. Rebovich, 267 Pa. Super. 254, 258, 406 A.2d
791, 793 (1979).
155. The natural mother of an illegitimate child is not entitled to support. Common-
wealth v. Donnelly, 14 Pa. D. & C,2d 40, 43 (1958).
156. See R.J.K. v. B.L., 279 Pa. Super. 71, 74, 420 A.2d 749, 750 (1980).
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idence demonstrates that the child is not that of the husband.1 57 The
mother, however, is a competent witness in a paternity action, 58 and
the contract is strong evidence of intended paternity.
Even though the contract would seem to be an admission of pa-
ternity, the biological father would be entitled to other defenses, in-
cluding access to the surrogate by her husband.' 59 The court would
likely order that the child, the mother, her husband and the putative
father undergo blood tests.160 After weighing all relevant factors, the
court will decree an order for support provided the necessary burden
of proof is met.
C. Breach After Birth
Breaches occur most often after the birth of the child. The sur-
rogate, and her husband, if she is married, might decide to keep the
child."' On the other hand, the biological father might reject the
child.
16 2
The timing of a post-birth breach is critical to the outcome of
157. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6704(d) (1982). The older Pennsylvania statutes and case
law held paternity cases as criminal actions, which made the evidentiary burden beyond a
reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Leider v. Leider, 210 Pa. Super. 433, 436,
233 A.2d 917, 918 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 434 Pa. 293, 254 A.2d 306 (1969). The
constitutionality of the lowering of the burden has been upheld. See Minnich v. Rivera, 509
Pa. 588, - A.2d - (1986).
158. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2513(c) (1985).
159. In order to prove non-access by the husband the evidence must be clear, direct,
satisfactory and irrefutable. Commonwealth v. Savage, 218 Pa. Super. 265, 267, 275 A.2d
832, 833 (1971). The presumption is that the husband has access to his wife, that is, that the
child is legitimate. Id. at 267, 275 A.2d at 833.
160. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6133 (1982). The presumption of legitimacy is overcome if
all medical experts reviewing the results of the blood test agree that the putative father is not
the actual father. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6137 (1982).
161. Just such a case occurred in England. The judge granted custody to the surrogate
who was formerly a prostitute. He did so because the woman had abandoned her former occu-
pation and promised not to return to it because of the child! Parade Magazine, Feb. It, 1979,
at 14, col. 2. A similar case currently is being appealed in New Jersey. The surrogate com-
plained of missing the infant child. The couple agreed to let her have custody for a week.
When six policemen arrived at the surrogate's home to pick up the child, the surrogate passed
the baby out the window to her husband, who fled to Florida. New York Times, Aug. 28,
1986, at 22, col. I. The trial court has ruled in favor of the biological father, basing its holding
on the fact that the contract was in the best interests of the child. In the Matter of Baby M,
FM-25314-86E (Sup. Ct. N.J. Chancery Div., Family Part). See supra notes 45-46 and ac-
companying text.
162. A well-publicized case involved a child who was born with microcephaly (an abnor-
mally small head which greatly increases chances of mental retardation). The biological father
refused to pay for medical care of the child. A court ordered him to do so. He then denied that
he was the father of the child. Both he and the surrogate's husband underwent blood tests and
agreed to have the results announced on national television. The tests showed that the child
was the surrogate's husband's. He then admitted to a previous child he had fathered who had
died in infancy from microcephaly. Transcript of Donahue Television Interview, No. 02023,
Feb. 2, 1983.
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any dispute. If the breach occurs before the surrogate consents to
adoption, " she is in a superior position to obtain custody of the
child. Once the surrogate signs a valid consent to adoption, the con-
tract is essentially completed; however, she still has the statutory ac-
tion of revoking the consent.164 Not until a decree for adoption or an
order terminating the surrogate's parental rights is entered does the
biological mother lose the right to refuse to the couple's adoption of
the child. "
1. Breach before valid consent to adoption.--Once the child is
born the state has a compelling interest in the welfare of the child."
If the couple 117 rejects the child, it is certain that the surrogate could
recover on the contract. 68 The surrogate could then choose to place
the child with an adoption agency. 169 Any costs incurred by the sur-
rogate in proceeding with adoption by a third party should also be
recoverable because they are the foreseeable result of the breach. 70
Of course, the surrogate could opt to retain custody of the child and
sue for child support after establishing paternity.17 '
If the surrogate refuses to consent to adoption or to deliver the
child, one result is clear: the biological father's wife would not have
standing to compel adoption,' 72 but the natural father would have
163. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711(c) (1985) (no consent to adoption is valid if given
prior to 72 hours after birth).
164. Id.
165. The earlier of the two decrees determines the date of the extinguishment of paren-
tal rights. Id.
166. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973).
167. The Comment addresses only a breach by the couple before the surrogate consents
to adoption. It seems unlikely that the couple will breach after this point, because the health of
the child should have already been ascertained. Even a later breach, however, would involve
substantially the same remedies as discussed below.
168. See supra note 114-15 and accompanying text.
169. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2301 et seq. (1985).
170. Compensation is awarded only for those injuries that the breaching party had rea-
son to foresee as a probable result of his breach. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 330 (1933).
171. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
172. The reason for this is three-fold. First, the wife of the biological father is not a
party to the contract. See Brophy, supra note 9, at 263-64. Second, the surrogate's consent to
adoption is not valid until 72 hours after birth. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711(c) (1985). Cf.
Keane, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 17 (arguing that adoption statutes do not contemplate a
situation whereby consent is given prior to conception, but only consent given while the mother
is pregnant). Id. at 152-59. See also supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. Third, the
pertinent statute does not give her power to file for involuntary termination of parental rights.
A petition to terminate parental rights . . . may be filed by any of the
following:
(I) Either parent when termination is sought with respect to the
other parent.
(2) An agency.
(3) The individual having custody or standing in loco parentis to the
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the right to assert paternity1'" and to seek custody of the child.'7 4
Assuming the surrogate is granted legal custody of the child,
she should return all monies paid by the father beyond certain medi-
cal expenses. 175 Generally, one who is unjustly enriched at the ex-
pense of another is entitled to restitution. 6 Clearly, the surrogate
mother would be unjustly enriched by having had all her medical
expenses paid and then refusing to relinquish custody.
The surrogate could also pursue an action for support.'7 It is
anomalous that the surrogate could profit from such a breach by
compelling the father to pay his share of child-rearing expenses. The
court must consider the best interests of the child. Therefore, in the
case of a single surrogate, the most equitable remedy would be to
grant custody to the couple and perhaps grant visitation rights178 to
the surrogate.
In the event the surrogate is married, the result might differ
depending on the fitness of the parents and the best interests of the
child and who has filed a report of intention to adopt required of section
2531 (relating to report of intentions to adopt).
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2512(a) (1985).
173. Arguably a putative father's right to assert paternity is less than the mother's right
to bring a paternity action. Comment, Womb For Rent. supra note 92, at 247. The relevant
statute allows the putative father to acknowledge paternity if the surrogate joins in the
acknowledgement. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8302 (1985). If the surrogate refuses to acknowledge
his paternity, the father is left with the task of rebutting the strong presumption of the legiti-
macy of a child born in wedlock. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8302 (1985). The father, however,
receives no parental rights as to the child, except that the statute entitles him to notice of any
hearing to terminate parental rights as to the child. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8303 (1985).
The surrogate could conceivably take no action, which would ultimately sever the putative
father's parental rights when the statute of limitations ran. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
6704(a) (1982) (six years, or two years beyond date of any voluntary support payment). How-
ever, such a result would clearly violate equal protection rights. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972). The Court in Stanley held that, "by denying [an unwed father] a hearing
and extending it to all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged, the state
denied the unwed father equal protection of the laws." Id. at 649.
174. See infra notes 186-205 and accompanying text.
175. This is gleaned from the result in Gorden v. Cutler, 324 Pa. Super. 35, 471 A.2d
449 (1983) (the court compelled a woman, who had accepted payment of medical expenses in
exchange for a promise to allow the couple to adopt, to repay the monies after she breached
the agreement).
176. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § I (1937). The surrogate might attack such a
claim by asserting that custody contracts are voidable and that the court should leave the
parties in the position in which it found them. Gorden v. Cutler, 324 Pa. Super. 35, 471 A.2d
449 (1983). Such a defense should fail, however, for the reason that even a voidable agreement
can give rise to a claim for damage under quasi-contract. CALAMARI & PERILLO, §§ 1-12.
Quasi-contract is also called implied-at-law contract. Id. In reality, there is no agreement.
However, it is an obligation imposed by law where one has been unjustly enriched to the
detriment of another. Id.
177. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4501 (1985). See also supra notes 149-55 and accompanying
text.
178. See infra notes 200-205 and accompanying text.
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child."' Assuming the court decides to grant custody to the surro-
gate and her husband, it would only be equitable to declare that the
surrogate's husband is the father in fact, and that the child is not
entitled to support from the natural father.
2. Rights after consent to adoption.-Once the surrogate exe-
cutes a valid adoption consent, the contract is completed. The surro-
gate does have the statutory right of revoking the consent any time
before the court enters an adoption decree, or a parental-rights ter-
mination decree. 180 This places the couple in an awkward position.
The contract has been fully performed, but the statute might deny
them the full benefit of their bargain. One remedy, albeit unsatisfac-
tory, is full restitution of the contract.
The couple's best course would be to pursue an action against
the surrogate for involuntary termination of parental rights.'81 In de-
termining the rights of a parent the court shall give primary consid-
eration to the needs and welfare of the child."8 2 The Superior Court
interprets the statutory test as:
[Whether] a parent has demonstrated a continued inability
to conduct his or her life in a fashion that would provide a safe
environment for the child, whether that child is living with the
parent or not, and the behavior of the parent is irremediable as
supported by clear and competent evidence..."'
Certainly this test is a huge hurdle for the couple to overcome.
All things being equal, it is unlikely that the couple would succeed in
such an action,'18 but failure does not completely terminate the bio-
logical father's right to custody of the infant.'85
179. See infra notes 185-205 and accompanying text.
180. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711(c) (1985).
181. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511 (1985). The couple's position would be favorable once
the child has been in their custody for 6 months and the surrogate has made no attempt to
exercise parental duties toward the child. See infra note 193. The couple in the Baby M case
succeeded in involuntarily terminating the rights of the surrogate mother, which allowed the
biological father's wife to adopt the child. See supra note 2.
182. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511(b) (1985). However, the court should not decide on the
basis of environmental factors which are beyond the control of the parent. Id.
183. In re Adoption of Michael, 506 Pa. 517, 525, 486 A.2d 371, 375 (1984). The dis-
sent argued that the mother should be given the opportunity to care for the child before paren-
tal incapacity can be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 525-26, 486 A.2d at
376 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
184. It is reasonable to assume that the parents and/or their agent will have thoroughly
investigated the surrogate before entering that agreement. Therefore, it is likely that she is a
"fit" parent.
185. This discussion assumes that the father acknowledged paternity and the surrogate
joined in the acknowledgement. This rebuts any presumption that the surrogate's husband is
the father of the child. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8302 (1985).
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In determining a custody dispute the court is primarily con-
cerned with the best interests of the child, 8 6 regardless of legiti-
macy.187 The court must determine this factual dispute on a case-by-
case basis. 88 Although courts previously relied on a series of pre-
sumptions in paternity disputes, the trend has been to abolish any
presumptions. 9
For example, there is no longer a presumption that a mother
should always receive custody of an infant child.' 90 The presumption
that a natural parent should raise the child is also abolished,' 9' as is
the presumption that custody law favors two parent families.'92 The
"sole criterion in determining custody disputes is the best interests
and permanent welfare of the child."' 93
All things being equal, 94 the typical fact situation has the in-
fant child in the custody of the couple who are fit as competent par-
ents. The surrogate, on the other hand, is also likely to be a fit and
competent parent and may even be married. In such a situation the
amount of time the couple had custody of the child might control.' 95
186. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Society v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 93, 66
A.2d 300, 305 (1949); In re Hawthorne, 146 Pa. Super. 20, 22, 21 A.2d 521, 523 (1941). The
Pennsylvania legislature has declared that the public policy of the Commonwealth is for
shared custody of the child, when that is in the best interest of the child. 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. §
5301 (1985).
187. See Commonwealth ex rel. Lewis v. Tracy, 155 Pa. Super. 257, 260, 38 A.2d 405,
406 (1944).
188. See Commonwealth ex rel. McKee v. Reitz, 193 Pa. Super. 125, 128, 163 A.2d
908, 910 (1960).
189. See Commonwealth ex rel. Jordan, 302 Pa. Super. 421, 429, 448 A.2d 1113, 1117
(1982).
190. See Tobias v. Tobias, 248 Pa. Super. 168, 374 A.2d 1372 (1977).
191. See In re Custody of Hernandez, 249 Pa. Super. 274, 376 A.2d 648 (1977).
192. See Commonwealth ex rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 302 Pa. Super. 421, 429, 448 A.2d
113, 117 (1982).
193. In re Custody of Phillips, 260 Pa. Super. 402, 405, 394 A.2d 989, 990 (1978).
Jordan v. Jordan, 302 Pa. Super. at 429, 448 A.2d at 1117 (court should avoid mechanical
determinations and focus its analysis on the particular facts relevant to the child's best
interest).
194. This is a very generous assumption. Other factors could be: length of custody by
the couple; fitness of the couple; and living environment. For simplicity, however, this comment
considers all parties are of equal "parental fitness" regarding these other factors.
195. In re Adoption of Baby Boy J., - Pa. Super. -, 512 A.2d 689 (1986):
Parental rights may be terminated if a parent, by conduct continuing for a
period of at least six months, either has evidenced a settled purpose of relin-
quishing his parental claim to his child or has refused or failed to perform pa-
rental duties (23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511(a)). The performance of parents duties is an
affirmative obligation to love, protect, support and maintain communication and
association with the child. Consequently, being a parent is more than a passive
state of mind, it is an active occupation, calling for a constant affirmative dem-
onstration of parental love, protection and concern. A parent must exert himself
to take and maintain a place of importance in the child's life.
(cited in In re Stickler, - Pa. Super. - , , 514 A.2d 140, 142 (1986).
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The Superior Court has held:
[T]hat where two natural parents are both fit, and the child
is of tender years, the trial court must give positive consideration
to the parent who has been the primary caretaker. Not to do so
ignores the benefits likely to flow to the child from maintaining
day to day contact with the parent on whom the child has de-
pended for satisfying his basic physical and psychological
needs. '9
The court may award shared custody197 if it determines that
such an arrangement would be in the best interest of the child.'98
This result is unlikely. First, the child has not formed a relationship
with the surrogate. 99 Second, considerable animosity is likely to ex-
ist between the parties which might frustrate joint decision-
making.2 0'
Notwithstanding the fact that the couple should be awarded
custody, the surrogate might still seek visitation rights.20, In a visita-
tion proceeding the first concern is the best interest of the child. 2
Usually, to destroy or limit visitation rights is against public pol-
icy.108 Finally, visitation orders are temporary in nature and are sub-
ject to modification. 0 4 Therefore, if visitation adversely affects the
child, the court can remove the rights.20 5
196. Jordan v. Jordan, 302 Pa. Super. at 421, 425, 448 A.2d 1113, 1115 (1977).
197. Shared custody is often referred to as joint custody. However, it does not necessa-
rily contemplate shared physical custody of the child. What it does entail is joint decision
making between both parents on all major decisions affecting the child. See Miller, Joint Cus-
tody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 360 (1979).
198. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301 (1985) (stating that shared custody is preferred when in
the best interest of the child).
199. In awarding shared custody, it is necessary that the child has formed a relationship
with both parties seeking custody. In re Wesley, 299 Pa. Super. 504, 515, 445 A.2d 1243,
1248-49 (1982).
200. At least some degree of cooperation between the parties is an important considera-
tion. Id. at 516, 445 A.2d at 1249. However, at least one court has speculated that joint
custody might attenuate any animosity between the parties. Id.
201. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301 et seq. (1985).
202. See, e.g., In re Stuck, 291 Pa. Super. 61, 435 A.2d 219 (1981); (Commonwealth v.
Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965).
203. See, e.g., In re Stuck, 291 Pa. at 64, 435 A.2d at 220-21, Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa.
Super. 168, 175, 378 A.2d 879, 883 (1977); Commonwealth ex rel. Sorace v. Sorace, 236 Pa.
Super. 42, 344 A.2d 553 (1975).
204. In re Stuck, 291 Pa. at 64, 435 A.2d at 221; see also Freidman v. Freidman, 224
Pa. Super. 530, 307 A.2d 292 (1973).
205. In re Stuck, at 64-65, 435 A.2d at 221. The couple might advance the argument
that visitation rights are not in the best interests of the child in a surrogate situation. For
instance, they might assert that visitation by the surrogate may only confuse the child, and
that ultimately the child might be harmed psychologically. However, such an argument is




There have been numerous calls by legal commentators for the
enactment of legislation which will govern surrogate parenting
agreements. In the absence of such legislation, considering the
wealth of statutory material and case law dealing with custody,
adoption, support and other areas of family law, it appears that
courts are currently well-equipped to deal with any problems arising
from such a contract.
If the legislatures were to take any specific action, it should be
merely to declare that surrogate motherhood contracts are not illegal
or in contravention of public policy. The state should go no further,
except perhaps to define certain terms and generally regulate the
practice. The courts are in the position to view each of these con-
tracts on a case-by-case basis, and to provide for appropriate reme-
dies with an eye towards traditional family law. The legislatures can-
not contemplate all the situations surrounding a breach, and should
leave the courts a free hand to fashion remedies that fit the
circumstances.
Of course, the legislature could not provide that surrogate
agreements are specifically enforceable. Instead, the agreements
should remain voidable, but not void. Because the surrogate parent-
ing situation is legally complicated, the parties must be extremely
diligent in structuring the agreement and choosing the other party.
Any person or couple contemplating such an arrangement would be
well advised to consider the inability to specifically enforce the con-
tract. For no matter how desperately they seek a child, any dispute
must necessarily be resolved in light of the best interest and welfare
of the child.
John M. Suender

